Mechanisms for Institutional Reinforcement: The Case of European CBM Regime by Hong, Ki -Joon
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES  
Volume 16, Number 1, 2009, pp.67-79 
 
67 
Mechanisms for Institutional Reinforcement:  
The Case of European CBM Regime 
 
 
Ki -Joon Hong 
 
The objective of this article is to investigate the mechanisms underlying institutional reinforcement 
of the European CBM regime from Helsinki to Stockholm to Vienna and onwards in terms of path 
dependence theory. The research demonstrates that the creation of an institution is conditioned by 
particular junctures of history. The European CBM regime was a product of the particular situation of 
the divided Europe. The institutional reinforcement of the European CBM regime is doomed to be 
conditioned by this initial condition. The research also demonstrates that institutional reinforcement 
should be understood in the context of particularities of culture, identity, interest and experiences. 
Therefore, any effort to transplant a particular institution into other region in different historical 
context will turn out to be a failure. 
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The notion of confidence-building measures (CBMs) originates from the 1975 Helsinki 
Final Act, which was a product of multilateral negotiations among thirty five participating 
states. Over the past decade, the CBM regime evolved in three stages: the Helsinki Final Act 
regime (1975-1986), the Stockholm Document regime (1986-1990) and the Vienna 
Document regime (since 1990). The CBM regimes have allegedly reduced the risk of armed 
conflicts by building trust and reducing misperceptions and miscalculations in European 
security relations, thereby contributing to European peace and security. Analysts have tried 
to draw some lessons from the European experiences in pursuit of presenting a working 
model for other regions. In doing so, they come across such questions as “how can we 
account for the trajectory development of European CBM regime?” and “can they be 
transplanted into other regions?” 
Underlying assumption of this article is that the European CBM regimes reflected 
particular junctures of European history. The main argument here is that the trajectory 
development of European CBMs is subject to path dependence in institutional change. This 
view emphasizes that once a particular institution prevails it tends to persist in a changing 
environment. Thus, this article is to investigate the mechanisms underlying path dependence 
in the European CBM regime. 
To this aim, this article consists of mainly four sections. The first section discusses path 
dependence in institutional evolution; the second section examines the initial conditions for 
the Helsinki CBM negotiations; the third section describes the trajectory development of the 
European CBM regime; and the fourth section investigates the mechanisms underlying path 
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2. PATH DEPENDENCE IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
Recently the concept of path dependence has drawn attention of political scientists as a 
conceptual tool to understand and explain the particular characteristics of a complex social 
world (Thelen 1999; Mahoney 2000 & 2006; Pierson 2000 & 2004; Greener 2005; Mahoney 
and Schensul 2006; Page 2006). However, there is still substantial disagreement among them 
on how best to define and apply path dependence. It is noted that this article uses path 
dependence as self-reinforcing sequences in which initial steps in a particular direction 
induce further movement in the same direction such that over time it becomes difficult or 
impossible to reverse direction. This usage connotes the idea of increasing returns, self-
reinforcing or positive feedback processes. 
Given this definition, path dependence involves three phases: the first is the critical 
juncture in which ‘prior events’ or ‘initial conditions’ trigger a move toward a particular path; 
the second is the period of reproduction, that is, the period in which positive feedback 
mechanisms reinforce the movement along one path; and finally, the path comes to an end 
when new events dislodge the long-lasting equilibrium. Thus, every path begins and ends 
with a critical juncture, or what has also been frequently referred to as a punctuated 
equilibrium, marked by specific triggering events (Pierson 2000; Deeg 2001). 
As far as the mechanisms of institutional reproduction are concerned, we need to examine 
a variety of existing approaches. The first explanation is derived from utilitarian 
understanding of institutional self-reinforcing process. Underlying these mechanisms is the 
assumption that institutional genesis and reinforcement is based on a cost-benefit analysis of 
alternative choices. According to Pierson, a specific path is reinforced by positive feedback 
mechanisms or the realization of increasing returns to moving along the path (Pierson 
2000:251-267). He suggests four mechanisms which can generate increasing returns (North 
1990: 94; Arthur 1994: 112). The first mechanism is ‘large set up or fixed costs’: when set 
up or fixed costs are high, actors have a strong incentive to continue it. The second is 
‘learning effects’: actors gain knowledge in the process of regime operation and the 
knowledge is used to enhance the efficiency of the institutions. The third is ‘coordination 
effects’ which occur when the benefits an actor receives from a particular institution 
increases as others adapt their behavior to promote that same path. Finally, the mechanism of 
‘adaptive expectations’ is operative when actors expect other actors to adopt a particular 
option so the first set of actors adopts that option in order not to be left behind (Pierson 2000: 
251-267).  
The second explanation originates from functionalist tradition. Functionalists argue that 
institution is reinforced because it serves a function of an overall system. In this functional 
logic, institutional change usually requires an exogenous shock that puts pressure on the 
overall system, making a given institution’s function obsolete and demanding its 
transformation to preserve the system in the new environmental setting (Bock 1963: 229-
237). However, it should be noted that this functional path-dependent logic falls short of 
accounting for the origins of the institution.  
The third explanation regards power as an important driving force for institutional 
reproduction. This power-centered approach argues that the group that benefits from the 
institution tends to reinforce the institution in order to increase its power. The increased 
power of the privileged group encourages additional institutional reinforcement to solidify its 
power. Thus, the pursuit of power serves a motive to trigger institutional self-reinforcement. 




It should be noted, however, that this approach explains not only the long-term persistence of 
an institution, but also its eventual or sudden demise (Mahoney 2000). An institution may 
demise when the status-quo maintaining group is challenged by the status-quo changing 
group in the power struggle.  
The fourth explanation stresses that institutional reinforcement occurs when actors 
believe an institution is morally just or appropriate. Once a given institution is contingently 
selected, the institution is reinforced through processes of increasing legitimacy. In other 
words, the institution that is initially favored sets a standard for legitimacy; this institution is 
reinforced because it is seen as legitimate; and the reinforcement of the institution reinforces 
its legitimacy (Mahoney 2000). This approach also views that institutional transformation 
results from changes in actors’ subjective beliefs and preferences. 
The validity of these explanations will be critically examined in the institutional changes 
of the European CBM regime. As a first step, we need to trace back to the initial conditions 
of negotiations for the Helsinki CBM regime which had a strong conditioning effect on the 
selection of a path. 
 
 
3. INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR THE HELSINKI CBMS 
 
The Helsinki CBM regime was conditioned by the historical background of Europe 
during the period when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was 
initiated in the early 1970s (Hong 2002a: 121-144). First and foremost, the Helsinki CBM 
regime is a historical product of the particular situation of the division of Europe. The 
Helsinki CBM regime might not have been initiated without the pre-existence of NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. However, it does not necessarily mean that CBMs should always be 
negotiated through bloc-to-bloc dialogues.  
Second, the Helsinki CBM regime was in incubation under the period of détente. It was 
during the détente period, rather than during the Cold War, that some of the favorable 
preconditions for the Helsinki CBM regime developed. The climate of détente in the late 
sixties and early seventies made it possible to consider that finding a more successful modus 
vivendi between the East and the West might be more successful than earlier. 
Third, the initiation of the Helsinki CBM regime was possible only after acute security 
issues such as territorial disputes were settled. Since World War II, the German question had 
been an obstacle to the normalization of relations between the East and the West. However, 
just before the initiation of the CSCE in 1972 this problem was resolved. This leads us to 
another initial condition. There must exist a general consensus on the recognition of the 
status quo among the prospective member states of a security regime. Consensus must exist 
as to where the CBMs should be applied in geographical terms.  
Against these initial conditions, the negotiations leading to the Helsinki CBMs proceeded 
through four stages: (i) The Multilateral Preparatory Talks (November 22, 1972-June 8, 1973, 
in Dipoli near Helsinki); (ii) Stage I (July 3-7, 1973, in Helsinki); (iii) Stage II (September 
18, 1973-July 21, 1975 in Geneva); and Stage III (July 30-August 1, 1975, in Helsinki (Hong 
2002b: 293-391). 
As far as the military aspects of security were concerned, a primitive form of CBMs was 
developed at this point. It was in the Italian proposal on January 15, 1973 that military 
measures such as the “prior notification of major military movements and exercises in 
Europe and the exchange of observers at military maneuvers” were put forward for the first 




 In fact, almost all measures faced a large number of serious disagreements. Even if 
limited measures were agreed on by a majority of the delegations, there was strong resistance 
from the East against forming a clear and explicit mandate (Ferraris 1979: 45). The Soviet 
Union and the United States were against any notification concerning the movement of 
troops. Both superpowers, as well as France, also firmly opposed the linkage of MBFR and 
the CSCE. For this reason, results were inconclusive. This inconclusiveness concerning 
military aspects of security foreboded a series of difficulties in the Geneva negotiations.  
When it comes to the negotiations on the military aspects of security in Geneva, the 
participating States had different interests and aims in the negotiations from the beginning. 
To begin with, the NATO allies wanted to deal with military measures within the context of 
the CSCE but with some restrictions. They were not interested in including the military 
question of force and weaponry levels in the CSCE in that this was supposed to be covered 
by other security regimes such as SALT and the MBFR. For this reason, the allies viewed 
confidence-building measures as the most appropriate content for the military aspect of 
security of the CSCE.  
Meanwhile, the WTO allies (excluding Romania) did not want concrete military 
measures to be placed in the CSCE. They also stressed the MBFR as the primary locus for 
military negotiations in Europe, and even sought to exclude confidence-building measures 
from the negotiations (Maresca 1985: 169).  
In contrast, the Neutral and Non-alignment (N/N) group, not being protected by a 
military alliance, had different intentions. For them, the CSCE was the only forum for 
discussion of European military security where their security interests could be reflected. 
They even envisioned the CSCE as a pan-European collective security regime which could 
replace existing military alliances. From this point of view, their objectives were definitive: 
first to inject as much of a military nature as possible into the CSCE, and second to create 
some form of linkage between the CSCE and the MBFR (Maresca 1985: 170).  
When it comes to the specific CBMs, the general differences described above become 
more accentuated. NATO, on the basis of the concept of ‘openness’ of military activities 
perceived CBMs in political rather than in military terms. In contrast, the WTO (excepting 
Romania) objected to ‘openness’ as a means of instituting a form of legal espionage. 
Meanwhile, the N/N group, basically endorsing the Western initiative, advocated other 
CBMs such as the opening of military budgets, the extension of CBMs to the Mediterranean 
region as a whole, self-restraint of military activities, disarmament and linkage between the 
CSCE and the MBFR (Ghebali 1989: 3). 
After a long stalemate period, on October 9, 1974, the East showed willingness to accept 
the Western concept that the CBMs should be applied to the whole territory of Europe. 
However, a deadlock remained over other points. On March 13, 1975, the Soviet Union 
proposed an overall solution. This Soviet compromise proposal contributed to the speeding 
up of negotiations. In particular, some neutral countries stressed combining the ‘voluntary 
basis’ of notification with the concept of the political responsibility of notification itself. 
Later, the Soviet Union gave up its insistence on the mention of a ‘voluntary basis’ 
concerning the notification of maneuvers. On May 30, the Soviet Union finally proposed 
some parameters for notification. In addition to this, they agreed that “they may also notify 
small-scale military maneuvers to other participating states, with special regard for those 
near the area of such maneuvers.” This implies that the military maneuvers falling below the 
                                                          
1 See Document CSCE/HC/18, January 15, 1973. 




agreed threshold only required notification on an optional basis. They also agreed that the 
question of “prior notification of major military movements” should be further studied as a 
part of the follow-up to the CSCE in light of the implementation of the other CBMs in the 
CSCE.  
The confidence-building measures on the exchange of observers were initially agreed 
upon in July 1974. The details, however, were not evident until the parameters on the 
notification of major maneuvers were agreed upon, since these parameters defined the 
maneuvers to which observers would be invited. The fact that the Soviet Union agreed to 
include this clause in the CSCE is of significance because it provided the basis for 
verification in the second generation of CSBMs. According to a provision of the Final Act, 
the exchange of observers should be conducted ‘voluntarily,’ ‘bilaterally,’ ‘regardless of 
scope,’ ‘without any specific period of advance notice’ and ‘in the spirit of reciprocity and 
goodwill’ (Ghebali 1989: 12).  
In addition, several other CBMs were put forward, but only a Spanish proposal for 
exchange of military personal was accepted.
2
 A Yugoslav proposal that the CSCE states 
agree to refrain from certain types of military activities potentially causing anxiety, 
especially in frontier areas, met with a certain degree of success. This was reflected in the 
Final Act with a modified phrase that committed states to “take into account and respect” the 





4. PATHS TOWARDS EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CBMS 
 
The European CBMs have been elaborated on, step by step, through the three phases 
(Hong 2004: 60-63).
.
 The first generation of CBMs, which was codified in the Helsinki Final 
Act of 1975, evolved into the second generation of Stockholm Confidence and Security 
Building Measures (CSBMs), which is derived from the Stockholm Conference on 
Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in 1986. It 
was envisioned to extend the application zone of CBMs, to lower the notification threshold, 
to introduce on-site inspection provisions, and to contain constraining measures. Specifically, 
the resulting Stockholm Document provided for: obligatory notifications of military 
activities, lower thresholds for prior notification to 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, a 42-day 
notification period for military activities, obligatory invitations of observers to activities 
including more than 17,000 troops, lower thresholds on amphibious and airborne forces for 
notifications (3,000 troops) and observations (5,000 troops), annual calendars for planned 
notifiable military activities, a constraining provision prohibiting activities with more than 
40,000 troops unless notified in the current calendar, or with more than 75,000 unless 
notified in the previous year’s calendar; and verification of military activities by compulsory 
on-site inspection.
 
The third generation of CSBMs dates back to the Vienna Document in 1990 which was 
adopted at the Vienna follow-up CSCE meetings from 1986-89. The Vienna Document 
created a new set of mutually complementary CSBMs. The Document contained further 
                                                          
2 See Document CSCE/II/C/6, September 28, 1973, CSCE/II/C/15, March 8, 1974, and CSCE/C/16, 
March 12, 1974. 
3  See the Helsinki Final Act, Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of 
security and disarmament, Section I, para. 16. 
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information exchange provisions such as static information on existing forces, including 
structure, deployment, peacetime strength and major weapons and equipment systems; 
planned deployments of major weapons and equipment systems; annual military budgets; 
one obligatory evaluation visit of notifiable formations or units per year; and one airbase 
visit every five years. The Document also provided a mechanism for consultation and 
cooperation regarding unusual military activities and hazardous incidents of a military nature. 
In addition, it set up the computer-based CSCE/OSCE Communication Network for CSBM 
information exchange, and established the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting 
(AIAM) for all participating states to review and discuss implementation of the regime. At 
the same time, the Paris CSCE meeting in November 1990 established permanent institutions, 
including the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), which serves as the focal point for the 
implementation of CSBMs. 
According to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990, the CSBM negotiations 
reconvened under the same mandate and were concluded in 1992, just prior to the CSCE 
Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (March 24-July 8, 1992). The Vienna Document 1992 built on 
existing CSBMs, supplementing them with more detailed parameters, and introduced a set of 
new measures. The new CSBMs were devised to cope with the new security problems which 
had emerged in the post-Cold War era.  
The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting decided to establish the Forum for Security Cooperation 
(FSC) as the successor to the CSBM Negotiations and the CFE Negotiations. According to 
the Helsinki decision, the FSC was established with the following objectives: (i) negotiations 
of concrete measures aimed at keeping or achieving the levels of armed forces to a minimum 
commensurate with common or individual legitimate security needs within Europe and 
beyond; (ii) the harmonization of obligations agreed among participating states under the 
various existing instruments concerning arms control, disarmament and confidence- and 
security-building; (iii) the development of the Vienna Document 1992; and (iv) the 
negotiation of new stabilizing measures with respect to military forces and new confidence-
and security-building measures.  
After intensive negotiations, the FSC adopted five additional documents in 1993: Defense 
Planning, which obliged participating states to provide information about their defense 
policies and doctrines, force planning, previous expenditures and budgets; (ii) Programme 
for Military Contacts and Cooperation, including joint military exercises and training, the 
provision of experts, and seminars on cooperation; (iii) Principles Governing Conventional 
Arms Transfers, which emphasized transparency and restraint, and took into account respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country; (iv) Stabilizing 
Measures for Localized Crisis Situations, a non-obligatory catalogue intended to facilitate 
the adoption of measures in the event of local crises; (v) Global Exchange of Military 
Information (GEMI), obliging participating states to exchange information annually on major 
weapon and equipment systems, personnel and the command structures in their conventional 
armed forces worldwide. 
The Vienna Document was once again revised in 1994 and 1999. The Vienna Document 
1994, which was adopted in Budapest, strengthened compliance and effectiveness of CSBMs 
in crisis situations and improved the operation of existing measures. Meanwhile, the Vienna 
Document 1999 integrated an additional set of CSBMs with measures already agreed to in 
the Vienna Documents 1990, 1992, and 1994, as well as a chapter on regional matters. This 
latest statement of the OSCE CSBMs requires prior notification of military activity 
exceeding 9,000 troops. An important new feature of the Vienna Document 1999 is a chapter 




addressing the importance of regional aspects of security within the OSCE and encouraging 
participating states to complement the CSBM regime with measures tailored to specific 
regional needs. A number of mechanisms for risk reduction, for example, Mechanism for 
Consultation and Cooperation as regards Unusual Military Activities, Mechanism for 
Cooperation as regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature, and Voluntary Hosting of 
Visits to Dispel Concern about Military Activities are contained in their present form in 
Chapter III of the Vienna Document 1999. 
Another important achievement was the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military 
Aspects of Security. Adopted in Budapest, the Code of Conduct is a new, politically binding 
norm to regulate the role of armed forces in democratic societies. Since adopting the Code, 
the OSCE participating states have held three follow-up conferences to review possible ways 
and means to improve its implementation.
4
 
In 2000, the FSC adopted the Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). 
This aims at combating illicit trafficking of small arms and at reducing and preventing the 
destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons.
5
  
Most recently, the FSC adopted a Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition 
(SCA) in 2003. This document outlines criteria for identifying any surplus stockpiles of 
conventional ammunition, explosive material or detonating devices that pose humanitarian 
and security risks and also sets up a mechanism for providing assistance to requesting 
participating states to address these risks. 
 
 
5. MECHANISMS UNDERLYING PATH DEPENDENCE 
 
As mentioned at the outset, path dependence is defined as self-reinforcing sequences in 
which initial steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction 
such that over time it becomes difficult or impossible to reverse direction. Given this 
definition, the question is how to account for the trajectory development of the European 
CBM regime in terms of path dependence. In order to do this, we need to examine the 
reinforcing mechanisms underlying the institutional development of CBMs.  
First of all, utilitarian approaches explain the institutional reinforcement in terms of ‘high 
set up costs,’ ‘learning effects,’ ‘coordination effects’ and ‘adaptive expectations.’ The 
validity of these mechanisms is examined one by one below.  
To begin with, as we have already seen, the participating states paid high set up cost for 
the Helsinki CBM regime throughout the painstaking multilateral negotiations for more than 
two and a half years. The primitive CBMs reflected the many political pressures and changes 
that were taking place in and among the countries represented. Adopting a document that 35 
Heads of state or Government would be willing to sign, at the same time and in the same 
place, was a more difficult task than anyone had anticipated. National objectives clashed and 
the complexities of the subject matter defied easy solution. The ‘high set up cost’ paid for 
initiating the CBM regime drove the participating states to have a strong incentive to 
                                                          
4 Recent milestones in implementing the Code have been the Special Meeting of the FSC in September 
2006 and the Special Meeting of the FSC subsidiary body Working Group A in May 2007. 
5 According to the data exchanged, OSCE participating states destroyed 5,273,168 units of SALW 
between 2001-2005. Of these, 4,352,154 were deemed surplus and 912,014 units were seized from 
illegal possession and trafficking.  
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continue.  
Second, through ‘learning effects’ the participating states are gradually assured that 
CBMs enhance transparency and predictability in military activities (Hong 2007: 45-63). To 
illustrate, even though no part of the Final Act was legally binding and CBMs were explicitly 
‘voluntary’, a political commitment was clear, and its implementation record was moderately 
encouraging during the period 1975-1986. The implementation of the Stockholm CSBMs 
was also positive. During the period 1987-1991 a total of 147 military activities were 
signaled. In addition, even in the post-Cold War era, the Vienna CSBMs have been fairly 
well implemented except for some cases of non-compliance by the newly admitted states. 
Indeed, the learning process of the regime effectiveness drove the participating states to 
reinforce the regime itself in the sequential negotiations. 
Third, in the same vein, the participating states experienced ‘coordination effects’ 
through reciprocal compliance with the rules and procedures of the CBM regime. In other 
words, the benefit of the CBM regime increased as the participating states implemented the 
regime reciprocally. The benefit that the participating states get from the CBM regime is the 
reduction of the possibility of surprise attack by raising the predictability and transparency of 
military activities. The assurance of ‘coordination effects’ among the participating states 
resulted in institutional reinforcement of the CBM regime. 
Fourth, the European CBM regime evolved due to the self-fulfilling character of 
expectations shared by the participating states. Projections about future benefits from CBMs 
led the participating states to adopt their actions in ways that helped make those expectations 
come true. The shadow of future was cast over the annually repeated CSBM implementation 
meetings. Consequently, this led the participating states to adapt their next actions to the 
expected benefits in the following round of the game. 
Secondly, functionalist approach argues that institution is reinforced because it serves a 
function of an overall system. The primary function of a CBM regime is to control intentions 
of staging a pre-emptive attack. It focuses on regulating the activities of military forces by 
forecasting far in advance or otherwise notifying exercises or concentrations of troops in 
excess of various thresholds, and by inviting observers to such activities. It is apparent that 
the possibility of surprise attack in Europe has been considerably reduced by the 
implementation of CBMs. Evidence supporting this statement is that no surprise attack has 
been launched in Europe since the creation of European CBM regime in 1975. However, it is 
difficult to establish to what extent the European CBM regime contributed to the overall 
security system in Europe (Hong 1997: 183-186).  
However, the logic of functionalist approach does not always hold true. In fact, the 
revision of the Vienna CSBMs of 1990 can not be explained by the same logic. On the 
contrary, the institutional reinforcement of the Vienna CSBMs was due to the fact that they 
failed to serve the then European security system. The implementation in 1991 of the Vienna 
Document of 1990 demonstrated that despite faithful compliance to the provisions of the 
Document, the CSBMs fell short of coping with many security issues in the post-Cold War 
era. Some measures and parameters were rendered irrelevant due to the new situations in 
Eastern and Central Europe; and it became evident that risk-reduction mechanisms were in 
need of improvement to handle domestic conflicts like the Yugoslavian civil war. 
Accordingly, the CSBM negotiations reconvened in November 1990 and continued through 
1991. As a result, the Vienna Document 1992 was agreed upon in March 1992, just prior to 
the CSCE Helsinki follow-up meetings. Therefore, we can conclude that institution is 
reinforced even when it does not serve a function of an overall system.  




Thirdly, the power-centered approach assumes that the group that benefits from the 
institution tends to reinforce the institution in order to increase its power. In order to 
elaborate on this proposition, we need to examine which group got more benefits from 
reinforcing the CBM regime. Let us take examples from the Stockholm and Vienna 
negotiations. 
In Stockholm, it seems that NATO played a proactive role in envisioning a second 
generation of CSBMs by reinforcing openness or transparency in military activities in 
Europe (Hong 1997: 112). The WTO’s proposal was focused on political measures.
6
 We can 
infer from the proposals that NATO states were interested in militarily significant measures 
whereas the WTO in declaratory measures. NATO, which was inferior to the WTO in terms 
of conventional forces, was in favor of reinforcing the CBM regime. 
In Vienna, the situation became more complicated because of the structural changes in 
Europe in the late1980s. Comparing the NATO-WTO proposals we can find both similarities 
and differences. Agreement was apparent on information measures. However, there were 
also a number of controversial issues apparent between the two groups’ proposals, such as 
constraints relating to ground forces and measures applied to air forces and naval forces. 
First, the NATO states objected to the application of constraining measures to the activities 
of ground forces. The reason given was that “to restrict our ability to exercise would add to 
the advantages the Warsaw Pact already enjoys in the conventional forces balance.”
7
 
Accordingly they were certain to reject constraints until differences were resolved. Second, 
the NATO states were adverse to measures on independent air and naval activities. They 
argued that even though Stockholm Document already contained references to naval 
activities in the context of notification, observation and annual calendars, they were 
prejudicial to security in Europe.
8
 Third, they rejected the creation of ‘zones of confidence 
and security’ in Europe where lower levels of armaments and higher levels of restriction and 
constraints on military activity would prevail. They felt that this was based on the 
assumption that asymmetries had already disappeared, which they did not feel to be the case. 
The NATO states also held reservations on some ideas such as the use of modern technology 
to verify compliance with CSBMs, the development of a special communication system to 
overcome apprehensions, the establishment of a center for the reduction of risk and 
prevention of surprise attack, and permanent consultative arrangements. 
In fact, the Vienna CSBM negotiations suffered from serious set-backs in group cohesion. 
The United States (with its reluctance to engage seriously in the CSBM process) and Turkey 
(preoccupied with the vulnerability of its south-eastern region) were most often at odds with 
the other NATO states. The six WTO states separated into the Central European powers 
(Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) whose delegates were usually anxious to cooperate 
with the West, the two Balkan states (Bulgaria and Romania) and the Soviet Union (SIPRI 
1990: 452). It is obvious that these diverse positions created far greater complexities for 
                                                          
6 The Soviet Union’s proposal consisted of five political measures and one military-technical measures 
as follows: (1) prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons; (2) conclusion of a treaty on the non-
use of military forces; (3) freezing and reduction of military spending; (4) banning chemical weapons; 
(5) creation of a nuclear zone; (6) limitation of military maneuvers.  
7 See the statement by Sherman Garnett, representative of the Secretary of Defense on behalf of the 
United States, on May 12, 1989, in Vienna. 
8 See the statement in the Plenary Session by Ambassador Vieri Traxler, Head of the Italian delegation 
at the Negotiations on CSBMs on May 17, 1989, in Vienna. 
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reaching a compromise, even if they did not decisively block negotiations.  
Despite the controversies and disarray in group cohesion, the third generation of CSBM 
regime was finally adopted by the 34 Heads of State and Government in Paris on November 
21, 1990. This can be explained by other factors that emerged in the late 1980s. The first 
factor is that negotiators were under time pressure to produce a “summit-worthy” document 
for the Paris summit. The second factor is the Soviet Union’s change in its position after 
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. The Soviet delegate Oleg Grinevsky finally 
demonstrated flexibility on September 7, 1990 in stating that naval issues could be set aside 
until the next phase of the CSBM negotiations.
9
 The third factor is the traditional role of the 
N/N group in breaking the deadlock between East and West. Austria, Finland, Sweden and 
Switzerland submitted a final draft Vienna document (CSCE/WV.14) on November 17, 1990. 
It can be concluded that the power-centered proposition may hold partially true, but may not 
be generally applicable to all cases. 
Fourthly, legitimacy approach argues that once a given institution is established, the 
institution is reinforced because it is seen as legitimate by actors. Legitimacy of an institution 
is subject to actors’ subjective beliefs and preferences. It is self-evident that the European 
CBMs as a whole have been regarded as legitimate by the participating states, otherwise they 
could not have been reinforced. Even after the collapse of the Cold-War, the European CBM 
regime continued to change in light of meeting the challenges presented by the post-Cold 
War era. The harmonization of CSBMs and the elaboration of a code of conduct created a 
normative basis for meeting these challenges. In doing this the FSC provided an adequate 
framework for addressing a variety of issues.  
However, the traditional CBM regime developed within the CSCE turned out to fall short 
of the demands of the present era. There is no longer a military threat in Europe from the 
East-West confrontation. The principal threats and conflicts come more from the political, 
economic, societal and environmental dimensions rather than from the military dimension, 
and they are at a domestic or regional level, rather than an international level. This 
qualitatively new threat of conflict calls for a new approach to European CBM regime. In 
short, the current European CBM regime faces the crisis of legitimacy.  
The different approaches to the trajectory development of the European CBM regime 
support the argument that the evolution of the European CBM regime is path dependent. Of 
course, the path did not always mark a unidirectional progress. For example, the Belgrade 
Follow-up Meeting (October 4, 1977-March 9, 1978) can be seen as a setback for the CSCE 
security regime in that no agreement on any substantive issue was achieved. The general 
setbacks of the Belgrade Meeting mainly resulted from the deteriorating international climate 
and the emergence of the Carter administration, on the one hand, and monitoring groups of 
the Final Act in the East on the other. Even though the Belgrade Meeting failed to produce 
consensus on substantive proposals, we should not overlook the fact that it laid the 
groundwork for a step forward in the Madrid Follow-up Meeting (November 11, 1980-
September 9, 1983) and afterward. In other words, the sense of frustration felt in the 
Belgrade Meeting generated a sense of imperative in Madrid, consequently gearing new 
momentum in the Madrid Follow-up Meeting. From this fact, we can conclude that path 
dependent institutional reinforcement sometimes entails transitional fluctuations. 
 
                                                          
9  See the statement in the Plenary Session by Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky, Head of the Soviet 
Delegation on September 7, 1990, in Vienna. 







The primary objective of this article was to investigate the mechanisms underlying 
institutional reinforcement of the European CBM regime from Helsinki to Stockholm to 
Vienna and afterwards in terms of path dependence theory. The research demonstrates that 
the creation of an institution is conditioned by particular junctures of history. The European 
CBM regime was a product of the particular situation of the divided Europe. It was initiated 
under the international climate of détente in the early 1970s in an effort to stabilize security 
relations in Europe. There were also few favorable conditions to make the birth of the regime 
possible. Of significance is the pre-settlement of keen security issue such as territorial 
disputes. It is noted that recognition of status quo should be a precondition for 
institutionalization of CBMs. It is also noted that institutional change is very sensitive to the 
initial conditions. Therefore, the institutional reinforcement of the European CBM regime is 
doomed to be conditioned by the initial conditions. However, the initial conditions per se are 
also subject to exogenous impacts such as structural shifts. The European CBM regime 
should adopt itself to the new security environments after the collapse of the Cold-War in 
Europe. 
The research also demonstrates that complex phenomenon such as institutional 
reinforcement may not be explained by a single theoretical approach. Therefore, it is safe to 
say that the institutional reinforcement of the European CBM regime needs to be explained 
by an integral approach. The utilitarian mechanisms for institutional reinforcement hold valid 
to account for the evolution of the European CBM regime. The functional approach also 
explains how the European CBM regime served a function of the European security system 
to a certain extent. The fact that power is the most important, but complicated factor in 
security relations makes it difficult to examine the validity of power-centered approach. It 
could be concluded however that the proposition of power-centered approach may be 
partially applicable but may not be generally applicable to all cases. It is noted that the role 
of power in institutional reinforcement needs to be studied in more sophisticated way. 
Finally, legitimacy of an institution is subject to actors’ subjective beliefs and preferences so 
that it is very difficult to verify its propositional validity empirically. However, it is obvious 
that legitimacy is analogous to a litmus test for institutional decay or transformation. 
Finally, the most important lesson we learned from the European multilateral CBMs is 
that confidence building measures are socially embedded, communicatively constituted and 
culturally empowered. This means that institutional reinforcement should be understood in 
the context of particularities of culture, identity, interest and experiences. If ideas, norms, 
and practices matter, and if they differ from one social context to another, then history in turn 
matters. Not surprisingly, any effort to transplant a particular institution into other region in 
different historical context will turn out to be a failure. 
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